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1 Introduction
A prominent view among educators, policy makers and the population at large is that public
schools need to provide more and better education than they have in the recent past. Many
proposals for reform have been offered. On the one hand proposals calling for greater admin-
istrative accountability and greater parental, student, and teacher choice, have reflected the
public's perception that the public schools are failing because of what has been called mo-
nopolistic bureaucratic control (Chubb and Moe (J 990)). Put differently, this view suggests
that the current organizational structure results in inefficient use of resources. On the other
hand are proposals that call for greater public investment in education in order to attract
and retain teachers vital to the educational process (Reich (1988)). In this view, there are
not enough resources devoted to education. In either case, budgets, or control of budgets, is
an important aspect of the proposed reforms.
This 'new' reform movement focuses essentially on efficiency. For years, much of the dis-
cussion concerning educational reform focused on school finance and issues of equalization
or equity. The legacy of that era is legislation aimed at equalizing educational opportunity
by equalizing access to resources across school districts. Simply mandating employment of
equal resources across school districts may have undesirable efficiency consequences, partic-
ularly if differences in input prices across school districts are ignored. That is, schools should
be allowed to choose the efficient mix of inputs given the input prices they face. Successful
reform should account for differences in relative input prices (and the resulting production
possibility sets) faced by school districts.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a multi-output production technology that al-
lows us to determine how much education can be provided if a school district is allowed to
"The authors are listed in alphabetical order. Please direct correspondence to K. Hayes. The authors
would like to thank Susan Porter-Hudak for helpful comments concerning econometric issues.
2optimally choose inputs given the relative input prices they face and the total budget they
have at their disposal. This model identifies those school districts which get the most from
what they have, accounting for the prices they face and the total resources they have. Indi-
vidual school districts are judged relative to this 'best practice frontier', and are compared
to school districts with output mixes and input prices and budgets comparable to their own.
Using this model, we are able to simulate various equalization schemes by changing the
budget faced by individual school districts. For example, we can analyze the effect on educa-
tional output of a policy to equalize per pupil budgets. The resulting change in output can
be decomposed into a measure of efficiency and a measure of fiscal equality. Our efficiency
measure allows us to compare the observed level of output for a school district with the level
of output the school district could be expected to produce if they were using their current
budget efficiently. Our fiscal equality measure compares the level of output the school dis-
trict could produce if it operated efficiently given its current budget to the level of output
that it could produce if it operated efficiently and faced an equalized expenditure level. We
also simulate a policy intended to equalize the unit cost of education by letting all school
districts face a common input price vector. l Notice that this technique allows us to address
both reform issues. The early requests for equality of expenditures can be analyzed within
this framework as well as the more recent proposals calling for improved resource usage.
In section 2 we review recent work on the empirical application of production functions
and efficiency measurement in education. Section 3 reviews the distance function methodol-
ogy for modeling multi-output production technologies and provides an empirical model for
measuring efficiency and equity in schooling. In section 4 we employ data from Texas school
districts to empirically implement the model developed in section 3. The final section of the
paper offers policy implications and directions for future work in modeling school production
processes.
2 Models of School Production and Efficiency
Much of the research examining school production has taken one of two paths. For many
years researchers focused on estimating a single output, average production function for
schooling. The single output was usually taken to be a measure of student achievement and
was assumed to be produced using inputs related to school personnel, per pupil expendi-
tures, and family background. The estimated production function gave estimates (based on
average performance) of the marginal products of the inputs and allowed the researchers
to infer which inputs would have the greatest marginal impact on achievement. Cohn and
Geske (1990) have provided a thorough review of the output and input measures employed
in these types of studies. See Levin (1974) and Hanushek (1979) for critical reviews of the
IThe methodology can also be used to calculate ~lost' potential output due to resource misuse and 'lost'
potential output due to input price differences or differences in total budgets across school districts.
3
•production function approach.
Recent research on public school performance has taken a second path. Rather than
assume that schools are efficiently producing some aggregate summary measure of student
achievement, researchers have refined their modeling techniques to examine questions related
to scale, technical, and allocative efficiency. One of the major contributions of this literature
is the generalization to multiple outputs. Bessent and Bessent (1980) and Bessent et al.
(1982, 1983, 1984) have employed data envelopment analysis (DEA)2 to examine the perfor-
mance of schools in Texas. Fare, Grosskopf, and Weber (1989) also used linear programming
techniques to measure technical output efficiency for Missouri school districts. Using stochas-
tic estimation techniques, Callan and Santerre (1990) found evidence that school districts
in Connecticut produce primary and secondary education using inefficiently large quantities
of capital and transportation services. In an earlier study, Jimenez (1986) found evidence
that schools in Bolivia and Paraguay also used excessive amounts of capital. In addition,
Jimenez found evidence that almost half of the schools in Bolivia that teach both primary
and secondary students exhibited diseconomies of scale. Grosskopf, Hayes, Taylor and We-
ber (1991) calculate shadow prices of school district inputs in Texas and compare them to
observed relative input prices using a distance function approach. They find that most school
districts in the sample are not allocatively efficient.
Recently McCarty and Yaisawarng (forthcoming) combined DEA and stochastic esti-
mation techniques to measure efficiency for schools that employ discretionary inputs (such
as teachers and administrators) and nondiscretionary inputs (such as socio-economic char-
acteristics) in producing multiple outputs. They first used data envelopment analysis to
construct efficiency measures for schools and then regressed the efficiency score on the non-
discretionary inputs in the second stage. The advantage of this procedure is that it allows
managerial inefficiency over the discretionary inputs to be separated from inefficiency that
might occur as a result of differences in non-discretionary inputs.
Examining school performance using a production function or by defining a production
possibility frontier for given inputs is only one way of examining the performance of public
school outcomes. The cost function provides a dual way of specifying the production tech-
nology. The cost function gives the minimum cost of producing a given level of output for
given input prices. Barrow (1991) estimated a cost function frontier for schools in England
and found that actual costs were 4% to 16% above the minimum estimated cost for the
schools in his sample. One problem with employing a cost function approach to measuring
efficiency in the public schools is that public enterprises may not be cost minimizers. A
second problem is that public schools often face a fixed budget, and are not free to adjust
the level of expenditures. On the other hand, they do not take output as given (which is
2In this approach, the goal is to measure technical efficiency in a multiple output context. Technical
efficiency in this case is equivalent to Farrell technical efficiency and is typically calculated using linear
programming techniques.
4essentially the way in which the cost function is defined, since output is considered to be
exogenous when estimating a cost function). Rather, school districts act as though output
is endogenous, i.e., they seek to provide maximum feasible educational services given the
budget and input prices they face. The indirect output distance function provides a means
of overcoming both of these potential problems and is discussed in greater detail in the next
section.
3 The Indirect Output Distance Function
The indirect output distance function represents a convenient way of modeling the produc-
tion technology of a firm that faces a budget constraint when hiring inputs, but does not
necessarily take output as exogenous. While the cost function is capable of modeling a multi·
output production technology, the indirect output distance function is more appropriate for
firms that are cost constrained: in contrast to the cost function, the indirect output distance
function takes cost as exogenous. In addition, the cost function implies cost minimizing be-
havior on the part of the economic agent while the indirect output distance function makes
no equivalent a priori behavioral assumption.3 The indirect output distance function should
therefore be especially useful in modeling the technology of public enterprises that produce
multiple outputs under conditions of budgetary constraint. Our purpose here will be to
review the properties of the indirect output distance function as presented by Fare and Pri-
mont (1990) (see also Fare and Grosskopf (1991) and Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1986))
and to provide a functional form that can be employed to estimate it.
The following notation is employed throughout the paper
x (XI, ,xn ), a vector of variable input quantitites
p = (PI, ,Pn), a vector of variable input prices
U (UI,"" urn), a vector of output quantities
z = (ZI"'" Zt), a vector of fixed input quantitites
e = (c), scalar cost or budget.
Define the set G(pje, z) as
G(pje,z) = {u: U E P(x,z) and p'X ~ e}, (1)
where P(x,z) is the production possibility set for a given (x,z) and G(pje,z) is the largest
production possibility set allowing X to vary, but requiring that x satisfy the budget con-
3If the firm does minimize costs, however I and technology is homogeneous, the two functions are
equivalent.
5straint. It follows that P(x,z) is a subset of GP(pjc, z) for all x which satisfy p'X~c.
The (short run)4 indirect output distance function can be defined as
IDo(pjc,z,u) = min{B: ujO E G(pjc,z)}.
B,x (2)
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of the indirect output distance function for a typical
school district that produces two outputs. The set G(pjc, z) gives all the possible combina-
tions of two outputs that can be produced given the budget constraint faced by the school
district. The school district is observed to produce outputs represented by point U in the
diagram. The ratio OUJOA gives the value of the indirect output distance function and is
the measure we will use to judge the efficiency of individual school districts. The reciprocal
ofthe indirect output distance function (OAjOU) gives the factor by which all outputs could
be expanded proportionately if the school district were operating efficiently. It follows that
when the school district is producing efficiently (on the frontier of G(pjc, z)), the value of
IDo(.) is 1.5
In order to ultimately estimate the indirect output distance function, we exploit several
of its properties. From duality theory (see Fare and Primont (1990), p.883 or Fare and
Grosskopf (1991)) we know that
1Do(pjc,z,u) = min{Do(x,z,u): (pjc)'x ~ I}
x (3)
where Do(x, z, u) is the direct output distance function.6 Since x in (3) is chosen to minimize
Do(x, z, u) we can invoke the envelope theorem to yield
81Do(.)j8(pjc) = x(pjc, z, u), (4)
where x(-) is the input demand function for normalized price vector pjc, fixed inputs z and
multi-output level u.7 This result will prove useful in identifying optimal input usage given
school district budgets, and allows us to derive optimal subsidies. Furthermore, if we take
the logarithm of the indirect output distance function and differentiate it with respect to log
normalized prices we obtain the budget share equations for the inputs
8In1Do(pjc,z,u)j8In(pjc) = w(pjc,z,u) =pxjc, (5)
4The indirect output distance function defined here may be thought of as short run in the sense that the
choice of inputs is restricted to the subset of variable inputs, x.
5The reciprocal of the distance function can be thought of as a Farrell type output~increasingmeasure
of 'indirect' technical efficiency. The measure is Farrell-like due to its definition as a proportional scaling.
Farrell (1957) did not include budget constrained technology in his work. Fare and Grosskopf (forthcoming)
and Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985), (1988), and (forthcoming) generalize the Farrell efficiency measure
to the indirect case.
6Do(x,z,u) = min{O: ufO E P(x,z)}.
7This is true when technology is homogeneous.
6which can be estimated simultaneously with the distance function to improve the efficiency
of our estimated parameters.
Another property that we exploit in estimating an indirect output distance function is
that the indirect output distance function is homogeneous of degree +1 in outputs. That is,
IDo(pfc, z, AU) = ).,JDo(pfc, z, u),
which follows from the definition of the indirect output distance function.
We estimate the indirect output distance function using the translog form,
(6)
In I Do(pfc, z, u)
n n n
ao +I:ailn(p;jC) +If2I:I:aij ln(p;jc)ln(pjfc)
t=1 i=l j=l
m n m t
+I:13dn(Uk) +I:I: 13ik In(p;jc) In(Uk) +I:,rIn zr
k=l i=1 k=l r=l
n t
+I:I:,ir In(p;jc) In Zr'
i=l T=I
(7)
As mentioned above, to improve efficiency in estimating the parameters of (7), we also
estimate the budget share equations consistent with (7). Differentiating the above equation
with respect to In(pifc) yields the budget shares for the i = I,...,n variable inputs
Wi = Pix;jc = ai +I:aij In(pjfc) +I: 13ik In(ud +I:,ir In z., i = I,... ,n. (8)
J k r
If we set the distance function equal to its efficient (frontier) value, the left-hand side of
equation (7) is zero for all observations. To avoid this problem recall from (6) that IDo(')
is homogeneous of degree +1 in outputs. Therefore for each observation to be used in
estimating (7) a value that is unique to that observation can be used to multiply all output
values on the right-hand side and the value of IDo(-) on the left-hand side. Let this value be
As = Cs' We choose to multiply all outputs by the total budget, c., that each school district
has available to hire inputs. Since the left-hand side of (7) is now equal to In c, the indirect







0, i = 1, ... , n.
7
(9)The transformed indirect output distance function in logarithmic form and the budget
share equations now take the following form
InA, +lnIDo(p/c,z,u) - InIDo(p/c,z,A,u)
n n n
InA, aD +2:ai In(p;fc) +1/22:2:aii In(p;fc)ln(pi/c)
i=l i::::;} j=1
m n m t
+2:Ih In(Asuk) +2:2: f1ik In(p;fc) In(A,uk) +2:irIn Zr
k=l ;=1 k=l r;;;;l
n t




Wi = ai +2:aiiln(pi/c)+2: f1ik In(A,uk) +2:iirlnz"i = 1,... ,n.
j=1 k=l r=l
For estimation purposes we also divide each variable on the right-hand side of (10) by its
mean value so that when each (p;fc), Zr and A,Uk take on their mean value, the natural log
of those values is zero. Because the budget share equations of the n inputs must sum to one
we also impose the restrictions
n n







2:f1ik = O,k = 1, ...,m.
;=1
(11)
Since the cost function is symmetric in normalized input prices, the indirect output
distance function is also symmetric in normalized input prices leading to the final restriction,
aij = aji, for i =f j.
4 Empirical Results
To implement the model described in the previous section we employ data from 310 Texas
school districts with enrollment between 1000 and 5000 students. Our variable inputs consist
of various categories of employment, which represents more than 80 percent of current oper-
ating expenses. We include expenditures on maintenance and operations as a proxy for fixed
capital inputs. We also construct a set of variables which represent fixed home produced
inputs, which is explained in more detail below.
8Our vector of outputs is based on batteries of test scores. Hanushek and Taylor (1990)
have examined the potential problems that can arise in the use of test score data from a
single year as a measure of output and found that value added test scores provide a more
meaningful measure of output than test scores alone. We therefore estimate value added
test scores for students in grades 3, 5, 9, and 11 as our output proxies. For each of the four
grade levels we estimate the value added by the school district is based on
TEAMS89sg
3
D g+L, Di.gETHN ICITIi,s +D 4,gSES,+Ds,sXCOHORTs,g (12)
i=l
9
+L, Dj,gTEAMS87sj,g-2 + Esg, 9 = 3,5,9,11,
j=6
where TEAMS89sg is the average total TEAMS scores for school district s for grade level
gin 1989, TEAMS87sj,g_2 is the average TEAMS score in subject j (reading, writing, and
mathematics) for the same cohort two years previously,S ETHNICITYs,j is the fraction of
the student body of school district s that is asian, black or hispanic, respectively, SESs is
the fraction of the student body of school district s that is receiving free or reduced-price
lunches (the best available proxy for socio-economic status) and X COH0 RTs,g is the per-
centage change in the size of the grade 9 cohort between 1987 and 1989 (this controls for
schools which try to improve scores by shedding students). The estimated residual, f sg, rep-
resents the average value added in school district s. Because the four value added equations
share common regressors we estimate the system simultaneously using the SAS package for
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The parameter estimates of the equations in (12) are
presented in Table 1.
Estimating school district outputs as equation residuals generates output measures that
represent deviations from the state average. School districts that add less value than the
state average have negative output measures. Since the distance function methodology can-
not handle negative outputs, we transform the value-added residuals into tractable output
measures by adding the estimated value of the intercept from each equation to the value-
added residual for that equation.
Our proxies for the contribution of home production (treated as fixed inputs, z) are
calculated for each school district and each grade as
3





"Texas administers the TEAMS test annually to odd numbered grades.
9This is the predicted value (less the intercept) of student performance due to factors which
are not subject to the control of the school district in the current period. This is the sense
in which they serve to proxy fixed inputs.
We also have price data available for the four variable inputs of school administrators
(AD), school teachers (TCH), school support staff (SUP), and teacher aides (AIDES). The
budget each school district faces when hiring these four variable inputs is equal to the total
cost per student of hiring the four inputs. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each
of the four variable inputs, fixed inputs, four outputs, budget shares and costs. The value
added in grades 3, 5, 9, and 11 are reported as XAG3, XAG5, XAG9, and XAGll.
Recall that our original specification has zero as the left-hand side variable in the first
equation. To obtain a specification which can be estimated we exploit the homogeneity
property of the indirect output distance function by multiplying both sides of (10) by c,. As
a result, c appears On both the left and right-hand sides of equation (10) which may lead to
undesirable endogeneity on the right-hand side. To test whether the errors were correlated
with the regressors,9 we calculated Hausman's m-statistic.1O The null hypothesis is that the
parameter vector of the model specified in (10) and estimated using seemingly unrelated
regression is consistent and efficient, while the alternative hypothesis is that the parame-
ters of (10) are unbiased and efficient estimators only when estimated by three-stage least
squares. We first estimate the equation system in (10) simultaneously using the seemingly
unrelated regression algorithm in SAS. 11 Voie then reestimate the system of equations using
three-stage least squaresl2 and calculate Hausman's m statistic. Hausman has shown that
the m statistic is distributed as Xl", where J{ is the number of parameters estimated. In the
indirect distance function given by (10) there are 66 parameters with 24 restrictions for a
total of42 free parameters to be estimated. The value ofthe test statistic is m = 14.29. The
critical chi-square with 1% significance and 42 degrees of freedom is 66.206. We therefore
cannot reject the null hypothesis and use the SUR regression estimates for further analysis.
These are reported in Table 3.
An important research question in the economics of education and the school finance lit-
erature concerns how the outputs of school districts vary as their budget changes. Hanushek
(1981) found that there does not seem to be any significant positive relationship between
school district expenditures and student academic achievement. More recently Wahlberg
and Fowler (1987) have found that per student expenditures are an insignificant determi-
·We would like to thank Susan Porter-Hudak for her advice on this issue.
lOHausman's m statistic is given as m =N(t31 - t32)'[V(t3,) - V(t32)]-1(t31 - t32), where {32 and (31 are the
parameter estimates under SURand 3SLS. N is the number ofobservations, and V({31) and V({32) correspond
to the inverse of the information matrix under each estimation method.
liTo estimate the system ofequations given by (10), the budget share equation for teacher aides is dropped
to avoid exact linear dependence of the error terms.
12This requires that We specify instrumental variables to replace the output vector. We used second order
and cross terms as instruments.
10nant ofstudent academic achievement in New Jersey school districts. Chubb and Moe (1990)
in a comprehensive study of student academic achievement found that the organization of
schools and resources within schools were a more important determinant of student achieve-
ment than the level of school spending. Even though the evidence seems to be mounting
against 'throwing money at schools' as a way of promoting student achievement, the call
for more money for schools is still strong. Furthermore, there are still numerous court cases
that argue for greater equality of expenditures. We use our estimates of the indirect output
distance function in order to simulate the effect of a change in the budget of schools on the
output level of each school. Specifically, we wish to know: (1) the potential output gains
that are possible if resources are used efficiently, and (2) the potential output gains that are
possible if school districts have access to greater resources through a larger budget or equal
input prices.
To assess the potential gains from fiscal equalization, we examine two potential reform
proposals that equalize the size of the budget directly, and two reform proposals that equal-
ize budgets indirectly by changing input prices. First, we consider equalizing total per-pupil
expenditures across all school districts at the sample mean. This reform would be analogous
to giving each school district a budget set of G(pjcmean,z) where C mean is the average per-
pupil expenditure. Second, we consider increasing the per-pupil expenditures of all school
districts that are below the eman without changing the budgets of school districts that are
above the mean. For this reform we adjust the budget sets to G(pjC mean' z) for only those
school districts with per-pupil expenditures that are below the sample average. The remain-
ing reforms adjust input prices so that all school districts face the minimum observed price
and the mean observed price for each input. These reforms imply changing the budget sets
to G((pjC)min,Z) and G((pjC)mean,z), respectively.
For illustrative purposes, consider the option of allowing each school district to face a
normalized input price vector, (pjc), equal to the minimum (Pnjc) for each variable input
n = 1,...,N for the 310 Texas school districts in our sample. This implies that the budget
set G(pjc, z) will expand for all school districts which previously faced higher than minimum
input pricesY Returning to Figure I, the set G((pjC)min, z) gives the maximum production
possibility set that could be attainable if the school district faced the minimum normalized
variable input price vector, (pjC)min and its own fixed inputs14 The ratio GAjGB is our
measure of fiscal equalization (which we call FE for short) for the typical school district.
This ratio is equal to the value of the indirect output distance function for the school district
that is put on its own frontier divided by the value of the indirect output distance function
l3Since pic is a vector and we seek the smallest cost-deflated prices for each element of that vector, the
combination of input prices in (plc)m;n may not be observed for any individual school district.
140ur construction ofthe budget constraint assumes homogeneity ofinputs within each personnel category
(the price of teacher services, for example, is the average salary paid in that school district). While that
is clearly not accurate (there is variation in experience and wages, etc.), there is empirical evidence that
characteristics of teachers which are correlated with higher wages may not be correlated with higher test
scores. See, for example Hanushek (1986).
11when that school district is given access to the lowest possible input prices. The recipro-
cal of the fiscal equity measure gives the amount that the school district could expand all
outputs proportionally if they were originally operating efficiently (on their own G(pjc, z)
frontier) and then were faced with a new (minimum) input price vector. The total overall
difference (TO) in output for the typical school district starting with their own price vector
and performance, and ultimately facing the minimum normalized input price vector is then
TO = EFF * FE. In terms of Figure 1, TO = (OUjOA) * (OAjOE). It is important to
note that for our data set the largest G(pjc, z) set is for a hypothetical school district since
the minimum normalized input price varies for each input by school district. Notice that
allowing all school districts to face the same input price vector is not the same as simply
giving each school district the same total budget since relative input prices are changing in
the former case and not in the latter.
We can now demonstrate specifically how E FF and FE are calculated for the empirical
specification (10). In order to calculate observation-specific efficiency EFF" we first calcu-
late the estimated value of the indirect output distance function for each of the 310 school
districts in our sample as
(14)
n n n m
= aD +L a;ln(p;/c) + Ij2L L Qii In(p;/c) In(Pijc) + L Pdn(Asuk)
i=1 t=1 j=1 k=l
n m tnt
+L L pidn(p;/c) In(AsUk) +L 1, In z, +L L lirIn(p;/c) In Zr·
i=l k:=l T=l i::;:l r=l
In theory, the value of the indirect output distance function should never exceed one for
firms that are operating on their frontier. In the estimation of equation (14) however, an
error term with mean zero, but positive variance is assumed. For some school districts the
forecasted value of the indirect output distance function will therefore exceed the theoret-
ically plausible value. To account for this problem we calculate the residuals and find the
most negative residual for equation (14), which we call Rmin- We then add that negative
residual to the intercept term so that the corrected estimates for each school district of the
indirect output distance function, IV, never exceed the theoretically plausible value. We use
this corrected value as our measure of efficiency, where efficient performance is consistent
with IV = 1:
15
EFF, = (exp(l;;);s +Rmin))jAs ~ 1. (15)
Next we forecast what would happen to the value of IDo(·) jf the sth school district had
access to the minimal input price vector. In order to account for any previous inefficiency,
15Bauer (1990) provides an overview of some of the econometric issues involved in estimating frontier
functions by this approach and by alternative approaches.
12we first make the school district efficient relative to its own frontier. That is, we inflate each
output vector by the efficiency score, u,/EFF" and then forecast
60 +L C,i In((p;/c)min)






+L L ~ik In((p;/c)min) In(Asuk/EFF,) +I>y,lnz,
k r=l
n t
+L L ,iT In(p;/c) In ZT'
i=l r=l
We use (16) as the basis for our measure of fiscal equality. Specifically, we calculate the
value of the indirect output distance function for each school district as if it had access to
the lowest prices as follows
FEs I Do((P/C)min, Z, u/EFFs)
I Do((PIC)min, z, AsU/EFFs)/A, (17)
We can now verify that the total effect of an increase in G(p/c, z) is calculated for each
school district according to the identity
TOs = EFF,' FEs. (18)
For each of the four reforms under study, table 4 reports the mean values for our effi-
ciency measure given by (15), our equity measure given by (17), and the mean of the overall
difference in outputs (TO) given by (18). The mean value of EFFs for the 310 Texas school
districts in our sample is 0.708. This means that if each school district allocated their given
budget efficiently, then outputs would increase by an average of about 29% (1-.71=.29).
Note that we are judging performance relative to best practice (i.e., what is observed in our
sample) rather than some theoretical standard. In a constant returns to scale world, that
29% increase in outputs is equivalent to current production with 29% lower cost. This result
suggests that there are considerable gains to be made by improving the efficiency with which
current resources are allocated.
Changing school district budget sets can also produce considerable gains in output. As
Table 4 indicates, redistributing school district budgets so that all school districts can spend
13the same amount per pupil would result in an 8 percent gain in output (1-.922=.078) if
schools used their resources efficiently, and a 6 percent gain in output if they became no
more efficient than before. The gains in output would be at least six times larger if we bring
those school districts with below average expenditures per pupil up the mean without re-
ducing the budgets of those school districts that are above the mean. Of course, this second
option would require additional funds.
How much would these equalization policies cost? For those reforms that equalize by
changing the level of per-pupil expenditures, the calculations are rather straightforward.
Changing expenditures so that all school districts spend the state average would be a purely
distributional change, and would require no additional funds. Pulling those school districts
that are below the mean up to the average would require an expenditure for each school
district of the difference between observed expenditures and the mean level of expenditures.
On average, such a plan would cost $295 per pupil for the 180 school districts below the mean.
Determining the cost of equalizing the opportunity sets for the school districts by chang-
ing input price vectors is somewhat more difficult. To do so we calculate the input demands,
x('), using our indirect Shephard's lemma from (4) for each school district. In this case we
calculate x(-) as if they faced the minimum normalized input price vector and were pro-
ducing their original level of output (made to be efficient) inflated by the reciprocal of our
equity measure. That is we calculate x = f((plc)min, (ulEFF)IFE). We also calculate
{j = ({jl, ... ,{jn) such that (pIC)min = {j(pIC)ach where (pic)a" is the actual normalized input
price vector faced by the school district. The vector {j then gives the amount each normalized
input price must be deflated to reach the minimum normalized input price. If each school
district were to receive an input price subsidy equal to s, where {j(plc)act = ((p - s)/c)ac"
then each school district would face the minimum normalized input price vector. The nor-
malized input price subsidy would then be sic= (1 - {j)(plc) with the total subsidy to the
school district equal to Subsidy = Li(S,fC)XiC. For the 310 school districts in our sample
the additional cost per student of equalizing the production opportunity set ranges from
$402 to $1146 with a mean value of $900. With per pupil spending currently averaging
only $1921 for labor inputs it would appear that an equalization scheme of this magnitude
would be prohibitively costly. We also calculate the subsidy necessary to equalize the mean
normalized input price vector acroSS school districts. In this case school districts would lose
$43 per student on average, and would not require additional funds.
From the simulations presented in Table 4, we can draw two broad conclusions. First,
when we compare those reforms that require no additional funds we find that the output
gains from redistributing resources to equalize per pupil expenditures are greater than the
output gains from equalizing input prices at the sample mean. Further, when we compare
those reforms that require additional fun ding, we find that not only are the output gains
from changing the total expenditures greater than the output gains from changing the input
price vector, but also that the cost of changing total expenditures is substantially less than
14the cost of changing the input prices. Therefore, for the reforms considered here, increasing
the size of the budget is preferable to changing the input price vector: it generates greater
output for no more money.
Second, perhaps surprisingly, our results suggest that throwing money at schools can
help improve educational outcomes. Even if we assume that school districts will continue
to perform as inefficiently as they do under their current budgets, our results suggest some
gain in outputs. Nonetheless, it is obvious that such reforms would be much more effective if
coupled with policies to improve efficiency. In fact, our results suggest that significant gains
can be made by focussing solely on inefficiency. This has the clearcut advantage of requiring
no increase in funding.16
5 Policy Implications
Our results indicate that school district access to resources does play an important role in
determining the potential level of student achievement attainable in the school districts in
our sample. We find that money can matter. Although the total budget available to the
school district is important, we would argue that input price differences across school dis-
tricts are also important in determining the ability of school districts to deliver educational
outcomes. We show how subsidies to equalize real input prices could be derived.
This technique could be used to devise a state aid program incorporating a penalty for
inefficiency and subsidies for districts which must pay above state average wages to their per-
sonnel. Consider two school districts with identical input prices (pIc), but one has EFF of
.75 and the other EFF equal to 1.00 (perfect efficiency). The state aid formula could penal-
ize the district with the below average efficiency score which would encourage school districts
to maximize output given their input prices. Now consider two school districts with perfect
efficiency scores but different input price vectors. The state aid formula could be designed
to subsidize the school district which faces relatively high input prices based on the FE score.
Since the FE score presumes efficiency, school districts that are not efficient should have
their grants adjusted by their efficiency score. Less should be given to those districts which
are inefficient, ceteris paribus. This is equivalent to using the TO score as a basis for state
aid, since TO includes efficiency. This type of formula would be superior to many other state
aid formulae because it incorporates a potential penalty for resource waste and it acknowl-
edges that some schools face legitimately excessive or above average wages. Whereas power
equalization formulas encourage school districts to tax at a higher rate to get more state
aid, the formulation proposed here encourages school districts to use their current resources
more effectively without the added constraint of facing 'unfair' prices when compared with
16This presumes j of course l that efficiency improvements could be achieved costlessly.
15lower cost districts.
A formula of this type mitigates the need for a cost of education index, since major
resource costs (personnel) are included. This formulation does not explicitly consider the
additional cost of educating 'special needs' children, which is usually part of the design of
state aid formulas. In fact, the formulation employed here eliminates the need for consider-
ing this additional cost since it can be included as a fixed cost in specifying the model as
illustrated here (see (13). In this way, districts with relatively high proportions of special
needs children are not penalized; in fact, if they are effective at creating value added they
are rewarded. Including fixed inputs in the model puts school districts on 'equal footing'
with respect to the diversity and needs of the student body.
Our results may appear to be at odds with previous researchers because in defining our
output variables we attempted to purge the effects that home production of education and
socioeconomic variables have on observed test scores. We have also accounted for any inef-
ficiency that schools may be incurring so that our simulated changes in the budget are used
efficiently. While it may be difficult for the state of Texas to foster the resources necessary
to equalize indirect production possibility sets for its school districts, our results indicate
that efficiency gains are possible without any new allocation of funds.
This paper has employed a new methodology for examining questions relating to efficiency
and fiscal equalization in schooling. The method allowed a multiple output production tech-
nology to be specified for a public enterprise that is restricted by a budget constraint and has
no a priori behavioral objective. This technique could be used to design state aid formulas
which simultaneously address the issues of efficiency and equalization. Since our approach
explicitly accounts for variation in input prices across school districts, there is no need to
derive a cost of education index to adjust the state aid formula. Our formulation of outputs
also accounts for differences in the needs or backgrounds of the students on performance,
putting schools on equal footing.
Although researchers have recently concentrated on evaluating the performance ofschools
by examining improvement in test scores due to schooling, other outputs of importance are
also produced by schools. For example, policy makers and parents are also concerned with
the final outcome of the school process, such as school dropout rates, graduation rates, and
the ability of schools to prepare their students for the job market or for further study in
college. An examination of how well schools produce these alternative final outputs would
add to our knowledge of the school production process and merits further study.
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18Table 1
Estimates of School District Outputs
Variable Grade 3 Grade 5 Grade 9 Grade 11
Intercept 676.37 616.90 431.21 417.63
(27.97) (25.70) (31.25) (20.55)
MATH PRETEST 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.24
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
READING PRETEST 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.25
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
WRITING PRETEST 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
ASIAN 0.45 0.49 0.31 0.30
(0.71) (0.61) (0.55) (0.35)
BLACK -0.01 -0.13 -0.23 -0.24)
(0.11 ) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
HISPANIC -0.01 -0.003 -0.09 -0.15
(0.1 0) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
XCOHORT -4.8 -0.38 -0.40 -0.35
(0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
SES -0.75 -0.57 -0.28 -0.17
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
System weighted R-square is 0.4510
19Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
(Sample Size = 310)






























Z5 (Capital) 364,22613 115,047542
20Table 3
Distance Function Parameter Estimates
PARAMETER VARIABLE ESTIMATE STD. ERROR T-RATIO
AO INTERCEPT 7.54341 0.00484 1559.41
Al PI 0.11040 0.00121 90.95
A2 P2 0.076289 0.00183 416.27
A3 P3 0.07871 0.00134 58.65
Bl Ul 0.37756 0.14054 2.69
B2 U2 0.36291 0.14185 2.56
B3 U3 0.01863 0.10806 0.17
All PI*Pl 0.00648 0.01502 0.43
A12 Pl*P2 -0.00446 0.01685 -0.26
A13 Pl*P3 0.00137 0.01201 0.11
A22 P2*P2 0.12042 0.03011 4.00
A23 P2*P3 -0.09216 0.01970 -4.68
A33 P3*P3 0.08899 0.01859 4.79
Ell Pl*U1 -0.02991 0.03521 -0.85
B21 P2*Ul 0.13176 0.05311 -2.48
B22 P2*U2 -0.02754 0.05365 -0.51
B32 P3*U2 -0.04086 0.03932 -1.04
B33 P3*U3 0.03002 -1.44 • -0.04316
Cll PI*ZI 0.09671 0.04802 2.01
C12 PI*Z2 0.00300 0.04947 0.06
C13 PI*Z3 -0.01774 0.02698 -0.66
C14 Pl*Z4 -0.01736 0.01800 -0.96
C15 PI*Z5 0.00634 0.00447 1.42
C21 P2*ZI -0.0584.5 0.07232 -0.81
C22 P2*Z2 0.08187 0.07465 1.10
C23 P2*Z3 0.06163 0.04064 1.52
C24 P2*Z4 0.04235 0.02706 1.56
C25 P2*Z5 -0.02104 0.00670 -3.14
C31 P3*ZI 0.07086 0.05304 1.34
C32 P3*Z2 -0.08225 0.05468 -1.50
C33 P3*Z3 0.02311 0.02978 0.78
C34 P3*Z4 -0.01652 0.01985 -0.83
C35 P3*Z5 0.01891 0.00492 3.84
D1 ZI 0.02949 0.19108 0.15
D2 Z2 0.045865 0.19710 2.33
D3 Z3 -0.43113 0.10710 -4.03
D4 Z4 -0.10683 0.07141 -1.50
D5 Z5 0.17948 0.01753 10.24
Hausman's m-14.2958 •
21Table 4
Efficiency and Fiscal Equalization Measures
VARIABLE OBS MEAN ST. DEV. MIN MAX
• 1. Equalize budgets to mean (p/cm,an)
EFF 310 0.708 0.058 0.567 1.000
FE 310 0.922 0.125 0.641 1.601
TO 310 0.649 0.072 0.481 0.998
COST/PUPIL 310 $0 0 0 0
2. Level budgets below mean up to mean (p/c)m,an'
Districts below mean c
EFF 180 0.726 0.055 .595 1.000
FE 180 0.843 0.058 .641 .921
TO 180 0.611 0.043 .481 .727
COST/PUPIL 180 $295.00 90.00 $151.42 $548.55
Districts above mean c
EFF 130 0.682 0.052 0.567 0.810 •
FE 130 1.000 0 1.000 1.000
TO 130 0.682 0.052 0.567 0.810
COST/PUPIL 130 0 0 0 0
3. Equalize input prices at min (P/C)min
EFF 310 0.708 0.058 0.567 1.000
FE 310 0.674 0.068 0.472 0.895
TO 310 0.474 0.030 0.391 0.564
COST/PUPIL 310 $900 115.33 $402 $1146
4. Equalize input prices at mean (p/c)m,an
EFF 310 0.708 0.058 0.567 1.000
FE 310 1.011 0.103 0.705 1.342
TO 310 0.711 0.046 0.584 0.849







Figure 1: The Indirect Output Distance Function
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